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RESPONSE

Court-Agency  Dialogue:  Article  III’s  Dual  
Nature and the Boundaries of Reviewability
Emily Hammond*
ABSTRACT
Courts reviewing agency actions frequently offer more than a positive
analysis of the agencies’ decisions. They might engage in advice-giving, for
example, or temper the remedy as a way of modulating the impact of review.
These actions can be used in a dialogic way, to provide normative signals to
agencies. Yet because courts must judge agency actions only on the grounds
provided by the agency  at  the  time  of  the  agency’s  decision—and must ordinarily
remand actions that fail to meet substantive standards of review—these normative
signals require a delicate touch so as to avoid judicially imposed policy
preferences and any chipping away at Article III values. In his excellent study of
the ordinary remand rule, Professor Christopher J. Walker traces the
development of the rule and constructs a taxonomy of dialogic tools that might
profitably accompany remands. This Response praises Professor Walker’s  
contribution to the literature, and suggests several areas for future study. In
particular, this Response emphasizes the dual nature of Article III—consisting
both of powers and resistance norms—and suggests that a full account of courtagency dialogue ought to be mindful of this duality. Further, this Response
suggests that agency actions at the edges of reviewability offer a unique focal
point for considering how the competing Article III concerns operate. And finally,
this Response cautions that taken too far, dialogic tools can undermine judicial
responsibility  and  agencies’  constitutional  legitimacy.

* Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. My thanks to
Chris Walker for the dialogue regarding this Response.
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INTRODUCTION
When courts review agency actions, they can offer signals to agencies
and others beyond mere holdings and surficial reasoning on particular
points of law. At times this is apparent from the force of strongly-worded
opinions.1 More subtly, courts sometimes engage in advice-giving—
providing alternative rationales that presumably would have met the
applicable standard of review.2 The remedies available to courts also vary
the impact with which they have spoken.3 Regardless, the tools that courts
use in their dialogues with agencies ought to be viewed as devices that
necessarily impact the constitutional balance of powers. In Professor
Christopher  Walker’s  thoughtful,  hardworking  study  of  agencies’  tools  for  
enhancing court-agency dialogue, he develops a number of insights about
this balance of powers from an empirical assessment of the ordinary
remand rule in action.4 I am honored to provide this Response.
This Response proceeds as follows. Part I uses the ordinary remand
1 See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1100 (D.
Ariz. 2003) (calling an agency  interpretation  “knowingly  unlawful”).
2 See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 898 F.2d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(offering hypothetical ways in which agency might have lawfully reconciled various
statutory provisions). For purposes of Professor Walker’s article, this Response, and my
own past work, there is little need to distinguish between arbitrary and capricious,
substantial evidence, and the Chevron two-step standards. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(agency action can be set aside if “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law”); id. § 706(2)(E) (agency action can be set aside if
“unsupported by substantial evidence”); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–45 (1984) (applying two-step formula to review under 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(C) (agency action shall be set aside if “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority,
or limitations, or short of statutory right”)); Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and
Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1732–35 (2011) (“Although
these standards differ in their phrasing, each attempts to pair judicial deference with a
reasoned decisionmaking requirement.”).
3 See Hammond, supra note 2, at 1737–39 (discussing deference and remedies to
unlawful agency action); see also Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies
and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 370–71 (2003)
(contending remands without vacatur promote collaboration between courts and agencies).
4 Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for
Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553, 1590–1600 (2014).
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rule as a springboard for a brief overview of the role of administrative law
doctrine in furthering administrative legitimacy. This discussion sets the
stage  for  a  more  detailed  look  at  Professor  Walker’s  findings  and  analysis,  
which is the subject of Part II. Part  II  highlights  one  of  Professor  Walker’s  
most intriguing findings—an apparent Article III motivation in some
courts’   treatment   of   the   ordinary   remand   rule.      This   Part   applauds   that  
insight, but argues further that a normative framework for assessing courtagency dialogue  ought  to  be  mindful  of  Article  III’s  dual nature. That is,
Article  III  supports  both  the  courts’  countermajoritarian  power  and  various  
resistance norms meant to avoid interbranch conflicts and politically
motivated outcomes when possible. Part III uses two examples—the
standard of review for agency inaction5 and the exception under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)6 to reviewability for actions
committed to agency discretion7—to illustrate how the differing sides of
Article III bear on normative assessments of dialogic tools. It further
argues that the dialogic tools, taken too far, can undermine Article III
values.      This   Response   concludes   that   Professor   Walker’s   Article   is   a  
valuable contribution both on its own and in the questions it raises for a
continuing dialogue about how best to strike a balance amongst the
branches in administrative law.
I.

THE ORDINARY REMAND RULE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LEGITIMACY

The ordinary remand rule stems from the SEC v. Chenery Corp.
(“Chenery I”)8 principle, which provides that courts must review agency
actions solely on the basis of the rationales provided by the agencies
themselves.9 Thus, courts may not supply rationales for agency decisions
that the agencies themselves have not provided.10 When the rationale for
5 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (providing authority to “compel agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed”).
6 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012)).
7 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
8 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
9 The doctrine’s pedigree is in a series of dialogic opinions issued in cases involving
judicial review of an agency’s formal adjudications. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery
II), 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (“[A] reviewing court . . . must judge the propriety of [agency]
action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.”); Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 87 (“The
grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record
discloses that its action was based.”); see also Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional
Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 962 (2007) (explaining classification and
noting APA had not yet been enacted at time of Chenery I).
10 See Hammond, supra note 2, at 1735–37 (providing historical doctrinal account of
the Chenery principle).
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an agency action is lacking or inadequate, therefore, a court should apply
the ordinary remand rule, and send the matter back to the agency. 11
According to Chenery I, this approach reinforces separation-of-powers
principles   because   “agenc[ies] alone”   are   authorized   to   make   policyinfused administrative judgments.12 Were courts to uphold or reject agency
actions for reasons not developed by the agencies themselves, courts would
“intrude  upon  the  domain  which  Congress  has  exclusively  entrusted  to  an  
administrative  agency.”13
As discussed in more detail below, this reasoning reflects an Article III
concern that courts ought to avoid imposing policy preferences on the
democratically accountable branches. Further, scholars have demonstrated
that the Chenery I principle (and by extension, the ordinary remand rule)
has deeper constitutional implications: it counterbalances broad delegations
of discretion by requiring agencies to articulate how they have exercised
their power.14 It is thus fundamental to “the very legitimacy of the
administrative state.”15
It is helpful here to consider another fundamental administrative law
value that works in tandem with Chenery I to temper nondelegation
concerns: the reason-giving requirement. Put simply, courts cannot review
agencies   on   the   basis   of   the   agencies’   rationales   if   the   agencies   do not
provide those rationales.16 But the reason-giving requirement does much
more. It guards against arbitrariness, which, as Professor Lisa Bressman
has convincingly argued, has constitutional implications.17 And it furthers
procedural legitimacy as well as administrative law values by promoting
participation, deliberation, and transparency.18 Thus, the Chenery I
11 See, e.g., INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam) (stating proper
course is to remand to agency).
12 Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 88.
13 Id.
14 Stack, supra note 9, at 1000; Peter L. Strauss, Legislation That Isn’t—Attending to
Rulemaking’s “Democracy Deficit,” 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1351, 1356–59, 1365 (2010).
15 Hammond, supra note 2, at 1735.
16 See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990) (noting
that an agency must “take whatever steps it needs to provide an explanation that will enable
the court to evaluate the agency’s rationale at the time of decision”); Citizens to Pres.
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419–20 (1971) (describing need for
administrative record to facilitate review).
17 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 466–74 (2003).
18 For an exhaustive treatment of the reason-giving requirement’s legitimizing
features, see Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial
Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 323–26
(2013).
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principle, ordinary remand rule, and reason-giving requirement should be
understood as reflecting a set of constitutionally-grounded rules that
reinforce administrative legitimacy.
II.

DIALOGIC REMANDS AND THE THREE BRANCHES

Given the constitutional implications of the Chenery I principle,
ordinary remand rule, and reason-giving requirement, judicial behavior
when remanding decisions merits close scrutiny. In this regard, Professor
Walker’s  piece  makes  several  contributions  to  the  literature.    Some  of  these  
contributions owe to his methodology: he examines hundreds of decisions
citing recent Supreme Court precedent involving the ordinary remand rule,
372 of which involve petitions to review Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) immigration orders.19 Thus, he is able to construct an important
story about the court-agency relationship   in   a   context   where   people’s  
futures, and perhaps even lives, are at stake.20 In addition, he assembles
what  he  terms  a  “toolbox” of administrative common law meant to enhance
court-agency dialogue while preserving the separation-of-powers balance
struck by the ordinary remand rule.21 Professor   Walker’s   toolbox   alone  
will have important impacts.22
In addition to the insights gleaned from his empirical examination,
Professor Walker tracks the development of the ordinary remand rule.23 He
concludes that, although it originated with a focus on Article I
considerations—i.e., courts   respect   Congress’s   intent   that   agencies   decide  
particular matters rather than courts—it also reflects Article II values
related   to   the   executive’s   authority   to   faithfully   execute   the   law.24 This
observation seems consistent with the doctrinal and theoretical
19 See Walker, supra note 4, at 1580 (describing the methodology used to examine the
court-agency dialogue).
20 Using judicial reviews of BIA orders was an elegant choice because the Supreme
Court recently offered its view of the ordinary remand rule in this very context not once, but
three times. By staying in the same context, Professor Walker avoided any siloing—a
phenomenon in which lines of administrative law decisions develop unique features specific
to particular agencies under review—that may have taken place were he to have focused on
a different topical area. Cf. generally Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, AgencySpecific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499 (2011) (considering the silo effect).
21 Walker, supra note 4, at 1607.
22 From a practical perspective, it is a resource for courts and litigants seeking
authority for flexible case-management approaches in the administrative law context.
Moreover, by arranging the tools according to their dialogic promise and filtering those
tools through a constitutional powers perspective, Professor Walker adds further value for
courts and scholars alike.
23 Walker, supra note 4, at 1561–79.
24 Id. at 1564–65.
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development of administrative law more generally: after all, Chenery I
came   on   the   heels   of   the   New   Deal’s   legislative   outpouring,25 whereas
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.’s26
rationale ushered in a strong focus on executive power.27
What is more intriguing is that Professor Walker uncovers hints that
courts are mindful of Article III powers when they depart from the ordinary
remand rule. For example, some courts in his dataset referenced processtype concerns such as undue delay and unfair adjudicators when departing
from the rule.28 He thus highlights two judicial powers relevant to
administrative law: saying what the law is and protecting process-based
rights.29 Indeed, a closer look at the data brings these concerns into focus.
As noted above, BIA appeals involve high stakes; the number of
observations in the dataset also suggests the decisions are quite numerous.
These   attributes   may   heighten   the   courts’   countermajoritarian  
responsibilities and account for their occasional departures from the
ordinary remand rule.30
III. ACCOUNTING FOR THE DUAL NATURE OF ARTICLE III
But suppose one were to take one more step down the three-branch
road and consider how the other set of Article III values—those grounded
in judicial self-restraint—fare  in  the  article’s  account.    Although Professor
Walker mentions Marbury v. Madison’s31 classic  assignment  of  the  courts’  
power to say what the law is,32 he might also engage that portion of the
case that emphasizes courts are not to interfere with executive discretion
because  “the  subjects  are  political.”33 Although this sounds like an Article
II grounding, it also provides authority for what Professor Mark Seidenfeld
25

This time period saw frequent and broad delegations of authority to agencies. See
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1749, 1758–60 (2007) (outlining theories of administrative law over time); Emily Hammond
Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of
Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 756–59 (2011) (tracking the history of agency
models of behavior and deference to agency expertise).
26
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
27 See Bressman, supra note 25, at 1765 (“Chevron, more than any other case, is
responsible for anchoring the presidential control model.”).
28 Walker, supra note 4, at 1587–88.
29 Id. at 1587–89.
30 Professor Walker hints at this notion, but does not go so far as to claim that
protecting constitutional rights animates the courts’ departures from the ordinary remand
rule. Walker, supra note 4, at 1587–88.
31 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
32 Walker, supra note 4, at 1589.
33 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 166.
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has  called  “judicial  self-limitation.”34
This concept of judicial restraint has  been  called  a  “resistance  norm,”35
and  is  grounded  in  the  classic  concern  over  the  courts’  countermajoritarian  
difficulty.36 Although there is a robust literature in constitutional law on
this topic,37 administrative law scholars could do more to engage this
concept.38 The very idea of dialogue—which Professor Walker indeed
engages—suggests that courts will self-impose limits on their own power
to avoid confrontations with the other branches.39 On this understanding,
could Chenery I be viewed as being grounded  in  Article  III’s  softer  norms?
At the very least, this possibility warrants a closer look at judicial tools
of  engagement.    For  one  thing,  doing  so  illustrates  that  Professor  Walker’s  
toolbox extends beyond the immediate context he studied to other types of
adjudications as well as rulemakings. Even better, it provides a frame for
thinking   about   courts’   options   within   the   “grey   areas”   of   reviewability.    
Take two examples: the standard of review for agency inaction40 and the
“committed   to   agency   discretion”   exception   to   judicial   review   found   in  
§ 701(a)(2) of the APA.41
The reasons for these two examples are worth a pause. Each is a tricky
area of administrative law guided by separation-of-powers concerns; thus,
both embody many of the considerations identified by Professor Walker as
animating the ordinary remand rule. But each is different from the review
of adjudication context because each is an area where courts are much
more skittish about overstepping their roles. Whereas an agency
adjudication provides a developed record and affirmative exercise of

34

Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 292 (2011).
See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2000); see also Seidenfeld,
supra note 34, at 276 n.8 (collecting sources and describing Young, supra,  as  “coining the
phrase ‘resistance norm’ for a doctrine meant to discourage but not ban government action
that impinges on constitutionally recognized interests”).
36 See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 5 (1962)  (exploring  whether  “the  judicial  Power”  
under the Constitution was envisioned to include the authority to overrule duly passed
majoritarian legislation).
37 Hammond, supra note 2, at 1724 n.3 (collecting several examples of constitutional
law scholarship on dialogic considerations).
38 Professor Seidenfeld’s work grounding Chevron in Article III norms is an
important exception. See generally Seidenfeld, supra note 34.
39 See Hammond, supra note 2, at 1777–80 (connecting dialogic considerations in
administrative law to separation-of-powers values from constitutional law literature).
40 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012) (providing authority to “compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed”).
41 Id. § 701(a)(2).
35
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administrative power, agency inaction usually lacks a record and is in
essence a decision not to exercise such power. Similarly, the § 701
exception applies when there is no standard by which a court can judge
what  the  agency  has  done;;  there  is  “no  law  to  apply.”42 Although there is
sometimes a record in such circumstances,43 there typically has been no
exercise of administrative power, making it very difficult for courts to
assess the lawfulness of the agency’s  behavior.
As Professor Ron Levin has demonstrated, both of these examples are
animated by separation-of-powers and comparative institutional
competence concerns.44 They reveal judicial reluctance to interfere with
agency priorities, are identified in part by the absence of a legal standard to
help focus review, and lack an agency decision to help focus the issues on
review.45 The Article III account would counsel that, where courts identify
these possibilities, they should err on the side of demurring  in  the  agencies’  
favor because there are special risks that the courts would impose their own
policy preferences were they to take up substantive review.
And yet courts find ways to promote dialogue within these grey areas
using tools like the ones Professor Walker identifies. Where an agency
fails to respond to a rulemaking petition, for example, a court might retain
jurisdiction over the matter as a way of signaling its continued interest, yet
refrain from issuing a writ of mandamus. 46 For agency behavior within the
§ 701 exception, a court might find it lacks jurisdiction to review the case
but remind the parties of avenues for possible future review.47 Examples
like these show that, even where concerns for Article III self-restraint may
be heightened, courts can modulate their messages to simultaneously
invoke their Article III power.
Nevertheless, the tools should be used carefully to avoid tilting too far.
Consider,   for   example,   Professor   Walker’s   tool   of   providing   hypothetical  

42

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 283 (1987) (explaining that
otherwise unreviewable agency actions are not made reviewable by fact that the agency has
provided reasons).
44 Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN.
L. REV. 689, 771–72 (1990).
45 Hammond & Markell, supra note 18, at 338.
46 E.g., Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); cf. Walker, supra note 4, 1591–93 (discussing panel retention of jurisdiction).
47 E.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 377 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1208 (N.D. Fla. 2005) (finding no
jurisdiction because act was committed to agency discretion, but making note of other
avenues for judicial challenges); cf. Walker, supra note 4, at 1594–96 (discussing
hypothetical solutions).
43
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solutions to agencies along with their remand orders.48 His assertion that
this practice is not particularly troubling may not hold true in all
circumstances. The following example demonstrates.49 Suppose a court
holds an agency action invalid for failure to accommodate all of  a  statute’s  
provisions. The court offers a hypothetical rationale that, it suggests,
would have reasonably resolved the issue. The court remands the rule
without vacating it, and the agency does nothing for fifteen years, after
which it adopts a new rule  supported  by  the  court’s  hypothetical  rationale.    
The new rule is easily upheld on a subsequent challenge.
On one hand, this example suggests the value of court-agency
dialogue. After all, the agency benefitted from judicial guidance in
developing its rationale on remand and was rewarded by a subsequent
court. Yet viewed from a practical perspective, the overall scenario looks
close to rational basis review: an invalid agency rule remained in effect
against   the   backdrop   of   a   court’s   hypothetical.      This, of course, was the
very approach that Chenery I and its accompanying rules eschewed. Given
the constitutional grounding of Chenery I, the ordinary remand rule, and
the reason-giving requirement, this example suggests a problematic
exercise of judicial authority.50 Taking this understanding further, what
appears to be an act of judicial self-restraint—remanding without vacatur—
becomes an abdication of the judicial role that simultaneously upsets the
compromise of constitutionality that Chenery I established.
This claim is not meant to reach too far, but is raised to illustrate that
more work is needed to understand how the different Article III values play
out as courts select their communication tools and couple those tools with
remedies. Given that the grey areas of reviewability sharpen these
competing values, they may be fruitful areas for further exploration of the
constitutional implications of dialogic tools. And it is to Professor
Walker’s   credit   that   he   has   provided   an   insightful   launching   point for a
continuing conversation.

48

See Walker, supra note 4, at 1594–96.
This example is loosely based on a series of cases culminating in Environmental
Defense v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1320 (D.C. Cir. 2007), which is outlined in detail at Hammond,
supra note 2, at 1769–72.
50 Hammond, supra note 2, at 1782.
49

